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THE ALASKAN NATIONAL MONUMENTS OF 1978: 
ANOTHER CHAPTER IN THE GREAT ALASKAN LAND 
WAR 
Regina Marie Hopkins* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The most difficult thing to comprehend about Alaska is its size. 
The State of Alaska is 375 million acres; over one-fifth the size of 
the remaining forty-nine states.· In contrast, the population of 
Alaska is small, only 407,000 people.2 This amounts to one person 
per 833.33 acres.3 This tremendous extreme in population and size 
makes Alaska unique among the states.4 While most of the people 
live in either Fairbanks or Anchorage, I most Alaskan towns evoke 
comparisons with the Old West. With its vast tracts of virgin land 
and small isolated towns, the state is the last remnant of 19th Cen-
tury frontier America.' In small outposts, "pioneers" live in small, 
handmade log cabins heated by a fireplace or a wood burning stove 
and lighted by kerosene lamps.7 The people have no electricity, no 
* Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW 
I HAMMOND ALMANAC, INc., THE 1979 HAMMOND ALMANAC 355 (1978). 
2 ld. This figure is an estimate for the 1977 population. 
3 ld. This translates to 0.7 persons per square mile. 
4 ld. Alaska ranks last among the states in population density. The 49th state, Wyoming, 
has 4.1 persons per square mile.ld. at 457. Alaska's sparse population is in sharp contrast to 
its large size. The second largest state in area, California, has 40.4 persons per square mile. 
ld. at 361. 
I Judge, Alaska: Rising Northern Star, 147 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 760 (1975). The combined 
population of Fairbanks and Anchorage is approximately 250,000 people. 
S J. McFEE, COMING INTO THE COUNTRY 175-417 (1977). This book contains an excellent 
description of life in the town of Eagle, Alaska (population 100) and the problems that the 
inhabitants encounter trying to exist in the Alaskan wilderness. See also, Robinson, Alaskan 
Family Robinson, 143 NATIONAL GEOGRAPlUC 55 (1973). 
7 J. McFEE, supra note 6, at 198-202. 
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telephones or television.8 They live by hunting, trapping, and in 
some places, by prospecting.' Since there are no roads in most of the 
state,1O the only connection with the outside world is by the airborne 
pony express. And while such modern innovations as the snowmo-
bile are found, much of life in the state harkens back to .an earlier 
existence. 
Because of these conditions and the climate, most Americans are 
under the impression that the state is a frozen wasteland, inhabited 
only by polar bears and Eskimos. This is not an accurate picture. 
In almost all areas of Alaska, the summer temperature often reaches 
seventy degrees, and are almost invariably over fifty degrees in the 
summer months. II In addition, the state is rich in oil, minerals, 
timber, game and fish. Most surprisingly, Alaska has potential as 
an agricultural state, with an estimated two to three million acres 
of arable land. 12 Because of the large amount of land, and its poten-
tial riches, it is thus amazing that such a vast and sparsely popu-
lated land should be the subject of a bitter land dispute. 
On December 1, 1978 President Jimmy Carter created fifteen new 
national monuments13 in Alaska, as well as enlarging two existing 
ones, for a total land withdrawal of 56 million acres. The land was 
selected chiefly because of its value as a wilderness area, including 
unspoiled habitats for endangered species. 
President Carter acted under the authority of the American Anti-
quities Preservation Act of 1906 (hereinafter the Antiquities Act), 
which authorizes the President to create national monuments in 
order to preserve "historic landmarks, historic or prehistoric struc-
• Id. 
• [d. at 259-276. 
I·Id. at 17-18. 
II Id. at 102. 
12 HAMMOND ALMANAC, INC., supra note 1, at 355. 
13 Exec. Orders No. 4611-4627, 43 Fed. Reg. 57009-57131 (1978). A national monument is 
an area of land set aside in a preserved state in order to protect objects or areas of historical 
or environmental interest. American Antiquities Preservation Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. § 431 
(1976). The new national monuments are: Admiralty Island National Monument, Aniakchak 
National Monument, Becharof National Monument, Bering Land Bridge National Monu-
ment, Cape Krusentem National Monument, Denali National Monument, Gate3 of the Arc-
tic National Monument, Kenai Fjords National Monument, Kobuk Valley National Monu-
ment, Lake Clark National Monument, Misty Fiords National Monument, Noatak National 
Monument, Wrangell-St. Elias National Monument, Yukon-Charley National Monument 
and Yukon Flats National Monument. In addition, President Carter enlarged both Glacier 
Bay National Monument and Katmai National Monument. 
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tures and other objects of historic or scientific interest."14 The Presi-
dent issued seventeen proclamationsl5 which proscribed all develop-
ment of the land in question. The land withdrawal was necessary 
because congressional protection of the Alaskan wilderness lands 
was due to expire shortly thereafter on December 18, 1978.18 Secre-
tary of the Interior Cecil Andrus issued regulations governing the 
use of the monuments on December 26, 1978.17 
The presidential proclamations were the latest links in a chain of 
governmental actions concerning Alaskan land. Since the acquisi-
tion of the Alaskan territory, the federal government's attitude has 
often been one of indifference, but the pressure of recent events 
commanded the attention of Congress and the Executive Branch. 
The creation of the national monuments was another step in the 
long, and often tortuous, process of accommodating the conflicting 
interests of the various parties in Alaska, among which are the Na-
tives,I8 the state and the federal government. The state and Natives 
have brought suit in response to the presidential proclamations. I. In 
particular, the Bristol Bay Native Corporation has challenged the 
validity of Becharof and Katmai National Monuments.20 
" 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976). The Act reads: 
The President of the United States is authorized, in his discretion, to declare by public 
proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of 
historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the 
Government of the United States to be national monuments, and may reserve as a part 
thereof parcels of land, the limits of which in all cases shall be confined to the smallest 
area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected. 
When such objects are situated upon a tract covered by a bona fide unperfected claim or 
held in private ownership, the tract, or so much thereof as may be necessary for the proper 
care and mangement of the object, may be relinquished to the Government, and the 
Secretary of the Interior is authorized to accept the relinquishment of such tracts in behalf 
of the Government of the United States. 
(emphasis added.) 
" Presidential proclamations accompanying Exec. Orders No. 4611-4627, 43 Fed. Reg. 
57009-57131 (1978). 
II See note 57, infra. Congress froze 80 million acres of land in Alaska in order to protect it 
from development. Congress then gave itself until December 18, 1978 to decide whether to 
include any or all of the 80 million acres of land in the national parks system. 
17 43 Fed. Reg. 60252, 60255 (1978) . 
• 8 For purposes of this article the term "Natives" includes all Aleuts, Eskimos and Indians 
living in the State of Alaska. This use ofthe term parallels its use in the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1627 (1976). See text at notes 54-71, infra. 
It Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Alaska 1978); Bristol Bay Native Corp. v. Carter, 
No. 79-0355 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 6, 1978) (hereinafter Bristol Bay). 
20 Bristol Bay, supra note 19. 
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This article will discuss the legality of the President's actions in 
creating the national monuments, focusing, in particular, on Bristol 
Bay Native Corporation v. Carter. 21 The President's actions will be 
analyzed to see if they conform with the Antiquities Act. In addi-
tion, other legislation such as the Alaskan Statehood Act22 (herein-
after the Statehood Act) and the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act23 (hereinafter the Settlement Act) will be examined to see if 
there has been an implied revocation of the President's authority 
under the Antiquities Act. 
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ALASKA 
The United States purchased the Territory of Alaska from Russia 
on March 20, 1867.24 The price for the 375 million acres was $7.2 
million and amounted to less than two cents an acre.25 The treaty 
with Russia conveyed to the United States title to all vacant lands, 
public lands and all lands used by the aboriginal tribes. 28 Unlike 
land owned by the white population, which remained in private 
ownership, the land used by the Natives was not regarded as indi-
vidually owned property, and the United States thus took dominion 
over the land.27 Since the United States held title to the land, it 
retained the right to adopt any laws and regulations with respect to 
the Natives' land. 
A. Organic Act of 1884 
After the treaty with Russia was signed in 1867, the Territory of 
Alaska was ignored by the rest of the country. Sarcastically referred 
to as "Seward's folly" and "Seward's icebox," after Secretary of 
State Seward who engineered the purchase, Americans regarded 
Alaska a frozen wasteland with little or no value. In fact, it was not 
until seventeen years after Alaska was purchased that a territorial 
government was established. Prior to that time, there was no civil 
government in Alaska, no courts, no law.28 Only gradually did Con-
" [d. 
22 Alaskan Statehood Act, §§ 1-20, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958) . 
.. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1627 (1976) . 
.. Treaty with Russia (Alaskan Purchase), March 20, 1867, United States-Russia, 15 Stat. 
539. 
21 [d . 
.. [d. 
21 [d . 
.. E. GRUENING, THE STATE OF ALASKA 35-36 (1956). 
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gress realize that legislation would be needed to facilitate the settle-
ment of Alaska. The first issue to resolve was necessarily the ques-
tion of Native rights. Instead of creating reservations - the favored 
solution in the rest of the country - Congress passed the Organic 
Act of 1884.29 Under the provisions of the Act, the Natives were 
given a qualified right to possession of their aboriginal lands. Their 
rights to the land took precedence over all except the federal govern-
ment. However, Congress reserved until a later date the question of 
how the Natives could acquire actual title to the land.3D As a result, 
the Natives had no conveyable interest in their lands and were 
completely dependent on the United States for their right to con-
tinuing use and occupation. They had a right to possess the land, 
subject to total dispossession by the federal government. 31 They 
were, in effect, tenants at Will.32 As a result, the United States could 
use the land as it wished. 
The Natives' status was confirmed by the Supreme Court in 
1955.33 In the early 1950's, the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, an Alaskan 
tribe, sued the United States for the value of lumber which the 
government had taken from their lands without compensation. 
They claimed that the government's actions violated the just com-
pensation clause of the Fifth Amendment.34 However, the Supreme 
Court rejected the Tee-Hit-Ton's claim.35 The Court reasoned that, 
under the Organic Act, the Indians only had a possessory interest 
in the land which the Congress could divest at any time. The Or-
ganic Act only protected the Indians against claims from third par-
Id. 
During [the territorial) period in Alaska no hopeful settler could acquire a title to land; 
no pioneer could clear a bit of the forested wilderness and count on the fruits of his toil, 
or build a log cabin with the assurance that it was his; no prospector could stake a mining 
claim with security for his enterprise; property could not be deeded or transferred; no will 
was valid; marriage could not be celebrated; no injured party could secure redress for 
grievances except through his own acts; crime could not be punished. 
" Organic Act of 1884, ch. 53, 23 Stat. 24 (1884). 
3. Id. at 24. 
31 This status was subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians 
v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955). See also note 33, infra. 
32 A "tenant at will" has the right to occupy which may be terminated by either the owner 
or the tenant at his discretion. See C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 
83 (1962). 
33 Tee-Bit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. 272, 277 (1955). 
" U.S. CONST. Amend. V. The Fifth Amendment reads in part: "nor shall private property 
be taken for public use without just compensation." 
35 Tee-Bit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. 272, 277 (1955). 
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ties but not against the sovereign.3' 
Moreover, while the Organic Act alleviated many administrative 
and legal problems, it did nothing to help non-native settlers obtain 
title to land in Alaska. It was not unti11898 that Congress extended 
the Homestead Act37 to Alaska, which allowed settlers to acquire 
title to their land, and which in turn fostered immigration to the 
state. Gold was discovered in 1899, and soon other resources such 
as timber and fish were being exploited." As the great wealth of the 
land was discovered, there resulted a growing interest in Alaska. 3. 
Consequently, there was an increase in the population. Yet long 
after Alaska was no longer regarded as "Seward's folly," Congress 
continued in its policy of inaction.40 In every congressonal session 
from 1945 to 1957, statehood bills for Alaska were introduced and 
If It is well settled that in all the States of the Union, the tribes who inhabited the lands 
of the States held claim to such lands after the coming of the white man, under what is 
sometimes termed original Indian title or permission from the whites to occupy. That 
description means mere possession not specifically recognized as ownership by Congress. 
Mter conquest they were permitted to occupy portions of territory over which they had 
previously exercised "sovereignty" as we use that term. This is not a property right but 
amounts to a right of occupancy which the sovereign grants and protects against intrusion 
by third parties but which right of occupancy may be terminated and such lands fully 
disposed of by the sovereign itself without any legally enforceable obligations to compen-
sate the Indians. 
Id. at 279. 
11 Alaskan Homestead Act, ch. 299, 30 Stat. 409 (1898). 
If H.R. REP. No. 1045, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1978). This report accompanied H.J! .. 39, 
The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1978, which was not enacted into 
law. 
n Id. 
441 E. GRUENING, supra note 28, at 137. In 1912 Congress finally designated Alaska an 
organized territory and allowed it to send a delegate to Congress. Second Organic Act, Pub. 
L. No. 62-334, 37 Stat. 512 (1912). Congress waited 45 years to designate Alaska an organized 
territory even though the territory's population warranted a much earlier designation. The 
following table illustrates why (see table on following page): 
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defeated. 41 When Alaska was finally admitted to the Union in 1958, 
the federal government still owned 99 percent of the land. 42 
B. Alaskan Statehood Act 
Under the Alaskan Statehood Act of 1958,43 the state was given a 
land grant of about 103 million acres. 44 The Act gave the state 
twenty-five years to make its land selections out of any unoccupied 
federal lands in Alaska.45 However, any land held by Native groups 
was excluded from available lands in the selection poo1.46 The land 
grant was the largest ever given to any state government entering 
the Union. The total of 103 million acres given to the state was 
larger than the total acreage of the State of CaliforniaY 
POPULATION BY CENSUS NEAREST DATE OF ORGANIZATION 
Date of 
Organization Census White Total 
Arizona ...... Feb. 24, 1863 1870 9,581 9,658 
Dakota, N. & s. ..... Mar. 2, 1861 1860 2,576 4,837 
Idaho . Mar. 3, 1863 1870 10,618 14,999 
Illinois .... Feb. 3, 1809 1810 11,501 12,282 
Indiana May 7, 1800 1800 2,402 2,517 
Michigan .Jan. 11, 1805 1810 4,618 4,762 
Minnesota .... Mar. 2, 1849 1850 6,938 6,977 
Mississippi .. Apr. 7, 1798 1800 4,446 7,600 
Montana . . . . . May 26, 1864 1870 18,306 20,595 
Nevada . Mar. 2, 1863 1860 6,812 6,857 
Utah ..... Sept. 9, 1850 1850 11,330 11,380 
Washington Mar. 2, 1853 1860 11,138 11,594 
Wyoming July 18, 1868 1870 8,726 9,118 
Alaska 
1890 4,298 32,052 
1896* 10,000 37,000 
Source: H.R. REP. No. 1318, 54th Cong., 1st Sess. 751 (1896), reprinted in E. GRUENING, supra 
note 28, at 137. The House Committee on Territories used this table as evidence that Alaska 
was long-overdue for organized territory status. For further evidence of the federal govern-
ment's failure to respond to Alaska's problems, s~e generally, E. GRUENING, supra note 28. 
41 H.R. REP. No. 624, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 2933, 2936. At the time it was admitted into the Union, Alaska had been an organized 
territory for 41 years. Only three states-Utah, Arizona and New Mexico-had to wait longer 
for statehood. T~ average wait was ten to twenty years. [d. 
42 [d. at 2937. 
43 Alaskan Statehood Act, §§ 1-20, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958) . 
.. [d. § 6(b). The state was also given land in and around the city of Anchorage . 
.. [d. The time period was extended to fifty years in 1966. Act of November 2, 1966, Pub. 
L. No. 89-702, 80 Stat. 1098. 
4. Alaskan Statehood Act, supra note 43, § 4. 
" H.R. REP. No. 1045, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 70 (1978). 
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However, the Act did not address the basic problem of unclear 
ownership of Native lands. Under the Act, the status of the Native 
claims remained unchanged. 48 The Natives still enjoyed the right to 
possess aboriginal lands. As a result, they could claim possession to 
literally tens of millions of acres. Unfortunately, this issue was par-
ticularly acute since any selections made by the state were subject 
to the possessory claims of the Natives'" Similarly any lands leased 
from the United States government were subject to the same restric-
tions. 50 Only Congress had the power to abolish the Native claims 
and any act by the other branches of the federal government which 
diminished these rights would violate the Organic Act of 1884 as 
well as the Statehood Act.51 At first this did not pose a serious 
problem, but as Indians everywhere were becoming more concious 
and assertive of their rights,52 Alaskan Natives started bringing law-
suits, challenging the federal government's leasing of Native land 
and approval of state selections under the Statehood Act.53 
C. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. 
To address the problems of conflicting Native and state claims to 
.. H.R. REp. No. 634, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 28, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
An. NEWS 2933, 2951. 
.. See Edwardsen V. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359 (D.D.C. 1973): 
[T]he Statehood Act, read as a whole and read in the light of a legislative history showing 
an intent on the part of Congress to avoid any prejudice to Native possessory rights until 
such time as Congress should determine how to deal with them, did not authorize the 
State to select lands in which Natives could prove aboriginal rights based on use and 
occupancy. Accordingly, tentative approvals by the Secretary of the Interior of land selec-
tions in which such rights can be proven were void at the time they were granted. 
[d. at 1375 . 
.. Edwardsen V. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359 (D.D.C. 1973). "Until Congress acts to extin-
guish them, these rights to occupancy safeguarded from intrusion by third parties remain 
intact as an encumbrance on the fee." (citation omitted). [d. at 1371. 
I, [d. at 1375-76. 
I. 117 CONGo REc. 38471 (1971). Between 1951 and 1969, there were over 100 claims filed 
by Indians against the United States government involving approximately 500 million acres 
of land. 
II In 1966, Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall halted all Statehood Act selections 
because of the growing protests by Natives that their land was being taken from them in 
violation of the Organic Act of 1884. 34 Fed. Reg. 1025 (1969). See also United States V. 
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Alaska 1977), where the United States brought 
suit on behalf of the Natives against 140 companies and the State of Alaska for trespass. The 
action was brought because the oil development of the North Slope of Alaska took place on 
lands which had been occupied by Native Alaskans. The suit was barred because of the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1627 (1976). 
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the land, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act in 1971.54 The legislation had two main objectives. First, the Act 
attempted to provide "a fair and just settlement of claims by Na-
tives and Native groups."55 Second, Congress wanted to clear the 
cloud on the title of all Alaskan lands by extinguishing Native 
claims based on aboriginal title.58 
Under the terms of the Act, the State of Alaska was divided into 
twelve geographic regions, each designed to include Native groups 
with a common heritage and interests. 57 Regional corporations were 
established to administer the Native holdings in each of the re-
gions.58 The specific by-laws of the corporations were left to the 
Natives themselves, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the 
Interior.5g Each regional corporation was subdivided into village cor-
porations which were business organizations established in each vil-
lage in order to manage the village assets.eo Congress mandated that 
both corporations be governed by a board of directors, elected by the 
shareholders.at The Act also provided that all Natives over age 
eighteen be shareholders and only they were to be eligible for board 
membership.82 
In return for relinquishing their claims, the federal government 
gave the Natives 40 million acres of land.83 The land was allocated 
between the regional and village corporations. The title to the sur-
face estiate84 of 22 million acres in the immediate vicinity of the 
villages was given to the village corporations,85 while the regional 
corporations took title to the subsurface estate.18 The remaining 18 
million acres were conveyed in fee simple absolute87 to the regional 
54 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1627 ~1976) . 
.. Id. § 1601(a). 
51 This concern was evidenced in the House debates. See note 48, supra. 
57 43 U.S.C. § 1606(a) (1976). 
58Id. 
5' Id. § 1606(e). 
8. Id. § 1607. 
" Id. § 1606(0. 
12 Id . 
.. Id. § 1611. 
.. Title to the surface estate indicates that the owner is entitled to the use and enjoyment 
of the top soil of the land while mineral rights below the land are held by another owner. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1611 (4th ed. 1968) . 
.. 43 U.S.C. § 1611(a)(1) (1976) . 
.. Id. § 1611(b). 
" "Fee simple absolute" means that the owner of the property has total and unconditional 
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corporations. 88 
In addition to the 40 million acres, Congress authorized the pay-
ment of $462 million by the federal government over a period of 
eleven years as well as $500 million by the state from royalty fees 
paid to it by the oil companies." Under the Act, the funds were to 
be divided almost equally between the regional corporations and 
their village corporations for investments.7o The village corporations 
were to invest the money according to plans approved by their re-
spective regional corporation.71 However, the regional corporation 
was to distribute at least 10 percent of its payments directly to the 
shareholders.72 
The Settlement Act also made provision for the Alaskan wilder-
ness lands. In the Act, Congress mandated a ninety day freeze on 
all appropriations of federal land beginning December 18, 1971 
whether by the state, the federal government or the regional corpo-
rations.73 Following the freeze, the Secretary of the Interior was 
authorized to withdraw within nine months up to eighty million 
acres to be added to the national parks system.74 All other lands 
were open to appropriation. The Secretary then had one year to 
recommend the precise plans for the withdrawn lands.75 Congress 
then gave itself five years to act on the Secretary's recommenda-
tions,78 which period ended on December 18, 1978. 
To assist the Secretary in his selections, Congress established a 
Joint Federal-State Land Use Planning Commission77 consisting of 
ten members: five appointed by the Governor of Alaska, at least one 
of whom had to be a Native;78 four members appointed by the Secre-
tary of the Interior; and one by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.78 
ownership of both the surface and subsurface estates. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 742 (4th ed. 
1968) . 
• s 43 U.S.C. § 1611(c) (1976) . 
.. [d. § 1605. 
" [d. § 1606(j). 
71 [d. 
72 [d. 
73 [d. § 1616(d). 
74 [d. § 1616(d)(2)(B). 
" [d. § 1616(d)(2)(C). 
" [d. § 1616(d)(2)(D). 
77 [d. § 1616(a). 
7. [d. 
" [d. 
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The Planning Commission assisted the Secretary in his selections, 
and also assisted the state and Native groups in theirs.80 By estab-
lishing a single advisory committee to balance federal, state and 
Native interests,8! Congress hoped to achieve a coherent and com-
prehensive land development plan for the State of Alaska.82 
Once the recommendations were made to the Secretary, he re-
viewed them and then made his final recommendations to the Con-
gress for its consideration. Realizing that the existence of national 
parks, forests and refuges might create problems for the implemen-
tation of the Settlement Act because many Native villages were 
contained in the remaining unspoiled areas of Alaska, Congress pro-
vided for alternative selections by the regional corporations if the 
subsurface estates in which they were interested were withdrawn by 
the Secretary. 83 
Such restrictions did not apply to the village corporations. Con-
gress was especially concerned that the Native villager's life-style 
should remain intact.84 For example, if a village corporation chose 
land in a wildlife refuge, the Secretary was instructed to deed the 
surface estate to the village corporation and replace the land taken 
from the refuge.85 Similar provisions were made for land taken from 
parks and forests. The only proviso was that the village corpora-
'0 [d. 
" CONF. REp. ~o. 746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [19711 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 2247, 2257-58 . 
• 2 [d. However, the Joint Commission only served in an advisory capacity. As a result, the 
land selections were still made by each individual group. While the Joint Commission could 
offer its suggestions, it had no power to mediate the conflicting desires of the Natives, the 
state and the federal government. See Parsons, Land Use Planning and Alaska, 3 U.C.L.A. 
- ALASKA L. REV. 280 (1974). 
'3 43 U.S.C. § 1621(e) (1976) . 
.. CONF. REP. No. 746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in [19711 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 2247, 2256. One of the chief concerns of the Congress when it passed the Settlement 
Act was that Natives should be able to continue to live in their aboriginal state. See, 117 
CONGo REc. 36858 (1971). Therefore, the Natives who took land in the national refuge system 
were proscribed from developing that land. Congress felt that if the Natives wanted land to 
develop, they should look for it elsewhere. Only if the Natives continued to live in their 
aboriginal state, could they remain in the refuges. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1621(e) (1976). In this respect, 
Congress may have misunderstood the desires of the Natives. As in the case of the Bristol 
Bay Natives, many Native corporations are more interested in providing economic opportuni-
ties for their people, rather than living on a subsistence level. This assumption by the Con-
gress has created unavoidable conflicts as many Native groups are interested in land in and 
around the new monuments . 
.. 43 U.S.C. § 1621(e) (1976). However, the United States retains "the right of first refusal 
if the land is ever sold." [d. § 1621(g). 
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tion's use of the land be consistent with the rules and regulations 
of a refuge ,. 
Acting persuant to the Settlement Act, Secretary of the Interior 
Rogers Morton withdrew 86 million acres with recommendations to 
create various parks, forests and refuges.87 However, despite re-
peated attempts, a final bill failed to pass Congress by the Decem-
ber 18, 1978 deadline. Congressional protection of the withdrawn 
land was due to expire, and the land would have been open to full 
exploitation. President Carter stepped in to prevent this from hap-
pening, creating the national monuments on December 1, before the 
lands were available for selection. 
D. The American Antiquities Preservation Act of 1906 
When President Carter created the national monuments in 
Alaska, he was acting under the authority given him by the Ameri-
can Antiquities Preservation Act.88 This legislation allows the presi-
dent to withdraw areas of land anywhere in the United States from 
development if he considers them of historic or scientific interest.88 
Typically, national monuments have been created to preserve 
special objects of environmental value. to Thus, in each of the Alas-
kan proclamations, the President was careful to list several reasons 
why these particular lands were being set aside. 81 For example, Be-
charof National Monument82 was created because, first, it contains 
"one of Alaska's most recent volcanically active areas."83 Second, 
the park contains a salmon spawning area, Becharof Lake, which 
attracts large groups of the Alaskan brown bear"· Finally, the area 
contins the "unique subsistence culture of the local residents" 
.. Id. § 1621(g). 
87 37 Fed. Reg. 26842 (1972) . 
.. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976). See note 2, supra . 
.. [d. For example, recently created monuments include Congaree Swamp National Monu-
ment in South Carolina, Pub. L. No. 94-545, 90 Stat. 2517 (1976), and John Day Fossil Beds 
National Monument in Oregon, Pub. L. No. 93-486, 88 Stat. 1461 (1974). (Even though the 
monuments were created by presidential proclamations, the legislation was necessary for 
Congress to provide appropriations for the monuments) . 
•• See note 89, supra. 
" This would help the new monuments withstand judicial scrutiny if they were challenged 
in court . 
• 2 Exec. Order No. 4613, 43 Fed. Reg. 57019 (1978) . 
.. Presidential Proclamation accompanying Exec. Order No. 4613, 43 Fed. Reg. 57019-20 
(1978) . 
.. [d. 
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whose continued existence "depends on subsistence hunting."" 
Similarly, Katmai National Monument has been set aside because 
of large brown bear and red solmon populations and for the preser-
vation of the local subsistence culture." The new Alaskan monu-
ments are in many ways typical of recently created monuments.'7 
III. PENDING LmGATION: Bristol Bay Native Corp. v. Carter 
President Carter's decision to create the new national monuments 
has caused an uproar in Alaska.'8 Angry at the federal government's 
intrusion into "their state," Alaskan residents have responded with 
a flood of criticism and a flurry of lawsuits'" The outpouring of 
opposition is symptomatic of a long series of confrontations between 
the state and the federal government. 
Conflict was unavoidable. For most of Alaska's history, the fed-
eral government has ignored the state. lOO Congress has enacted legis-
lation to meet the needs of the people only after problems have 
become totally unmanageable. Only with the discovery of oil on the 
North Slope and the emergence of the environmental movement has 
'51d. 
If Presidential Proclamation accompanying Exec. Order No. 4619, 43 Fed. Reg. 57059 
(1978). 
17 See note 89, supra. 
If "[S)ome Alaskans opposed to President Carter's national monuments proclamation in 
the state have held demonstrations, undertaken civil disobedience protests in the newly 
created national monuments, and burned the President in effigy. They are gathering signa-
tures on petitions requesting Alaska's secession from the U.S., and are continuing the fight 
in the courts to halt the President's national monuments proclamation." 9 ENVlR. REP. 1744 
(BNA) (1979). 
II Anticipating the creation of the national monuments, the State of Alaska filed suit in 
late October, 1978 seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing President 
Carter from creating the national monuments. Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Alaska 
1978). The complaint alleged, inter alia, that a supplemental environmental impact state-
ment issued on October 25, 1978 by the Department of the Interior, prior to the President's 
actions, violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 
(1976). Whenever a federal agency undertakes any major action, it must publish a statement 
explaining the impact, if any, of the action on the environment. The public typically has 
ninety days to respond to the statement. The statement filed by the. Department of the 
Interior when the monuments were proposed was a supplement to the original impact state-
ment filed by Secretary of the Interior Rogers Morton on December 17, 1973, when he recom-
mended to Congress which national parks should be created. In particular, the state alleged 
that President Carter violated NEPA by closing the comment period on the impact statement 
45 days after October 30, 1978 instead of the usual ninety days. Alaska v. Carter, supra. The 
court denied a preliminary injunction on the grounds that NEP A does not apply to the 
President because he is not an "agency" within the meaning of the Act. 1d. 
100 See text at notes 24-42. 
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Washington focused its attention on the area. IOI As a result, many 
Alaskans resent the intrusion of the federal government into their 
lives at this late date. 102 The recent change of attitudes on the part 
of the federal government is paricularly irritating to newcomers to 
Alaska who have immigrated to the state in order to escape 
"civilization" and the accompanying big government. 103 To them, 
Alaska is a vast frontier where a man's fortune is there for the 
making. Such a dream is shattered by government regulations 
which prevent or restrict logging, mining, oil exploration, prospect-
ing or hunting. 104 As a result, they have no patience with environ-
mentalists or environmental concerns. 105 Starting with the struggle 
over the Alaskan pipeline,I08 the Alaskans have engaged in an angry 
struggle with environmental groups and the federal government. 107 
So fierce has been the struggle that a small but growing number of 
Alaskans have been arguing for secession from the Union. 108 Further-
more, the Alaskan legislature has taken steps to restrict the further 
'0' J. McFEE, supra note 6, at 233. 
'02 [d. at 279. McFee states this frustration best when describing the reaction of an Alaskan-
born man to recent federal actions in Alaska: 
[d. 
With his infant son, Jimmy, and his wife, Andrea, ... Stanley lives in a new cabin on 
his parents' property. He would have liked to build somewhere else, off in the hi1ls or out 
near the Yukon, in an unneighbored place he could call his own, but, in the vastness of 
all the surrounding country, land was not available. That, for Stanley, has been a bewil-
dering disappointment. When he was born, in 1950, the country was open and free. Expec-
tations were that when he grew up he could live where he pleased. Then Alaska became a 
state. Oil was discovered. Homesteading ended. In the great reapportionment of Alaskan 
land, the squares seemed to be moving as well as the checkers. Stanley, who had always 
been at ease with all aspects of this place and latitude, now found himself feeling more 
than uneasy. A government many thousands of miles away had "frozen" the land with 
printed words. 
'03 [d. at 279. 
'0' [d. at 301-318. 
, .. [d. at 294-296. 
, .. [d. 
'.7 [d. 
'0' See note 91, supra, and J. McFEE, supra note 6, at 306: 
The Alaskan Independence Party's candidate ... for governor was Joe Vogler, and his 
name appeared on the ballot with those of Wi1liam Egan, the Democratic incumbent, and 
Jay Hammond, a Republican. In implication and influence, the results of Vogler's cam-
paign were more sizeable than anyone might have guessed. All told, just under a hundred 
thousand votes were cast. The number by which Hammond defeated Egan was only two 
hundred and eighty-seven. Almost five thousand people voted for Joe Vogler and his 
declarations of independence. 
[d. 
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immigration of outsiders to the state}· With this "leave us alone" 
attitude, President Carter's actions are viewed as another unwar-
ranted intrusion into the internal affairs of the state. 
Because of the federal government's late-date intrusion, the new 
monuments have been attacked in the courts. 110 The chief lawsuit 
involves the Bristol Bay Native Corporation,11I one of the regional 
corporations established by the Settlement Act. 11z The complaint 
challenges the creation of two national monuments, Katmai and 
Becharof, on the ground that their creation has decreased the value 
of the Native's adjoining land, rich in mineral deposits}·3 The Na-
tives contend that this diminution of value is in violation of the 
'.Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act}·' Furthermore, the procla-
mations are claimed to violate the Alaskan Statehood Act because 
of a similar diminution in value of state land, inasmuch as oil and 
gas production will be curtailed. Thus, the state's ability to meet 
its royalty payments to the Natives will be in doubt}·1 Finally, the 
plaintiff contends that the proclamations violate the Antiquities 
Act because the subject land areas of the proclamations do not 
contain objects of scientific or historic importance, nor are they 
confined to the smallest area necessary to preserve proper care and 
management as required by the Act. This suit is currently pend-
ing. 11' 
A. Claims Under the Antiquities Act 
The Bristol Bay Native Corporation's complaint alleges that Be-
charof and Katmai monuments violate the Antiquities Act. The 
Corporation maintains that when Congress passed the Antiquities 
Act, its intent was to empower the President to protect specific 
... In 1978, the United States Supreme Court struck down an Alaskan statute that required 
all persons granted oil and gas leases, easements or right of way permits for oil and gas 
pipelines from the state to give hiring preference to Alaskan residents. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 
U.S. 518 (1978). The law was prompted by anger at all the outsiders who were coming to 
Alaska to obtain high-paying work on the pipeline. [d. 
liD See note 99, supra. 
II. Bristol Bay Native Corp. v. Carter, No. 79-0355 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 6, 1978). 
112 See text at notes 56-63, supra. 
113 Bristol Bay, supra note 111, at 10. 
114 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1627 (1976). 
III Telephone conversation with George Miron, plaintiffs attorney (March, 1979). 
III The venue of the litigation has been changed to the District Court of Alaska. Interview 
with Donald Barry, Attorney, Department of the Interior, in Boston (October 14, 1979). 
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objects of historic value, such as Indian burial grounds or prehistoric 
Indian caves but not to authorize creation of vast national parks. 
The Corporation asserts that neither Becharofnor Katmai National 
Monuments contain objects of antiquity such as Indian remains and 
that, if they do, the monuments are not limited to the smallest area 
necessary for proper management. 117 
The Corporation bases its assertions of illegality on the legislative 
history of the Antiquities Act. Plaintiff contends that it was not the 
intention of the Congress to allow the president to set aside vast 
tracts of wilderness as national monuments. In support, the Corpo-
ration relies upon the House Report of the Committee of Public 
Lands which recommended passage of the bill, stating: 
There are scattered throughout the Southwest [United States] quite a 
large number of very interesting ruins. Many of these ruins are upon the 
public lands, and most of them are upon lands of but little present 
value. The bill proposes to create small reservations reserving only so 
much land as may be absolutely necessary for the preservation of these 
interesting relics of prehistoric times. 1\8 
The Committee report contained a list of possible monuments,lJ9 
including cliff dwellings, prehistoric towers, communal houses, 
shrines and burial grounds. While the list is not all-illclusive,120 it 
does show that Congress was interested in preserving small, discrete 
objects of historic value, rather than large tracts of land whose pri-
mary value is to preserve wilderness areas. 
The same concern to limit the scope of the Antiquities Act to 
small areas of specific historic importance was echoed in the Senate 
Report. 121 Again, the emphasis of the report was on prehistoric ruins: 
[I]n view of the fact that the historic and prehistoric ruins and monu-
ments on the public lands of the United States are rapidly being de-
stroyed by parties who are gathering them as relics and for the use of 
museums and colleges, etc., your committee are [sic] of the opinion 
that their preservation is of great importance. 122 
117 See note 115, supra. 
lIB H.R. REP. No. 2224, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [1905-6] U.S. Doc. SERIES 4906 
(emphasis added). 
III [d. 
120 A rule of statutory construction is that when the legislature lists possible applications 
of the law, the list is not exclusive unless the legislature explicitly states so. 2A C. SANDS, 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.18 (4th ed. 1972). 
121 S. REP. No. 3797, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in [1906] U.S. Doc. SERIES 4905. 
122 [d. 
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Ambiguity regarding the intent of the bill was clarified during 
debate in the House of Representatives. During the debate, Repre-
sentative Stephens of Texas wanted to ensure that the effect of the 
bill would be limited: 
Mr. Stephens: I think the bill would be preferable if it covered a par-
ticular spot and did not cover the entire public domain. 
Mr. Lucy: There has been an effort made to have national parks in 
some of these regions, but this will merely make small reservations 
where the objects are of sufficient interest to preserve them. 
Mr. Stephens: Would [the amount of land] be anything like the forest 
reserve bill, by which seventy or eighty millions of acres of land in the 
United States have been tied up? 
Mr. Lucy: Certainly not. The object is entirely different. It is to pre-
serve these old objects of special interest and the Indian remains in the 
pueblos in the Southwest, whilst the other reserved the forest and the 
water courses. 123 
Based on the House debate and the committee reports, the Corpo-
ration is able to allege that the type of withdrawals made by Presi-
dent Carter are not within the intended scope of the Act. 
B. Claims Under the Statehood Act 
Even if the monuments comply with the provisions of the Antiqu-
ities Act, the Corporation believes that they are still illegal. The 
Natives contend that the new monuments frustrate the workings of 
the Statehood and Settlement Acts. 124 Since these laws were re-
cently enacted and are specific Alaskan legislation, while the Anti-
quities Act is an older statute which is applicable to the entire 
nation, the claim is made that the Alaskan Acts should control as 
they more nearly reflect the desires of Congress in the area. 
Specifically, the Bristol Bay Native Corporation alleges that the 
President has violated the Statehood Act l25 by reducing the amount 
of land available to the state for its land selections. Under the Act, 
the state was given twenty-five years28 to select 103 million acres as 
a land grant.127 By reducing the selection pool by millions of acres, 
123 Mr. Lacy was chairman of the Public Lands Committee which reported the bill to the 
fuJI House. 40 CONGo REC. 7888 (1906). 
12. Bristol Bay, supra note 111, at 12 . 
• " Alaskan Statehood Act, §§ 1-20, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958). 
12' [d. § 6(b). The period has been extended to fifty years. 
'21 [d. 
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the President has diminished the value of the state land grant. As 
a result, the state's royalty payments to the Natives under the Set-
tlement Act will suffer,128 If the President's actions impermissibly 
intefere with the Statehood Act then, plaintiff argues, the general 
statute must give way to specific legislative authority, namely the 
Statehood Act. 128 
C. Claims Under the Native Claims Settlement Act 
The Bristol Bay Native Corporation also alleges that the new 
national monuments violate the Settlement Act, in that they have 
made the Corporation's land selection worthless. 13o As part of the 
Corporation's settlement grant the Native group selected land north 
of Becharof and Katmai Monuments because of its rich mineral 
deposits. However, the only way to transport the ore out of the 
mines is through Becharof and Katmai, to the southeast, since the 
area is surrounded by mountains t'o the north and west. The only 
alternative to sending the ore south through the monuments is to 
ship it west to ports on Bristol Bay which are frozen most of the 
year. Therefore, plaintiff alleges that the President has deprived it 
of its just settlement under the Act. 131 
'23 Bristol Bay, supra note 111, at 12. The Natives may have standing to raise the state's 
interest, because if the state is deprived of valuable land, it would be unable to pay the $500 
million royalty fee. However, there is no evidence that the state would default because of the 
creation of the national monuments, or even that the state was interested in the same lands. 
Therefore, it is doubtful that the Corporation has third party standing to raise the state's 
claims. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organ., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
12' For a similar case where the Supreme Court held that a general statute must give way 
to a more specific one, see Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776 (1976). 
"0 Bristol Bay, supra note 111, at 12. 
'3' [d. The Natives' claim is not without threshold problems. In particular, the Bristol Bay 
Native Corporation is vulnerable to a 12(b)(6) motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
for failure to state a cause of action for which relief can be granted. By alleging that the 
national monuments violate the substantive provisions of the Settlement Act, the Natives 
must show that there is a legal obligation on the part of President Carter not to diminish the 
value of the Natives' land selections. Generally, absent zoning laws or restrictive covenants, 
there is no legal obligation on the part of an adjoining property owner to develop his property 
in a way most advantageous to his neighbor's interests. E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 
§ 1-4 (4th ed. 1978). The Natives must show that there is a legal obligation for President 
Carter to act in the best interest of the Natives. Generally, the federal government stands in 
a trust relationship with Native people. In 1790, Congress passed the Indian Nonintercourse 
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976), which required the federal government to protect Indian tribes 
from third parties. Similarly, the United States government has brought suit on behalf of 
Alaskan Natives against third parties. See, e.g., United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra 
note 53. The suit was based on the obligations imposed on the federal government by the 
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The question, then, is whether the President's actions unlawfully 
hamper the operation of the Settlement Act. In order to deal with 
the conflicting land claims of the state, Natives and federal govern-
ment, Congress established an elaborate procedure to balance each 
faction's demands.1u By unilaterally setting aside millions of acres 
of land, President Carter has threatened the balancing of interests 
which the legislation was meant to achieve. 
Viewing the plaintiffs claim in its most favorable light, one of the 
strongest arguments for overturning the proclamations is that, by 
acting before the expiration of the December 18 deadline Congress 
had set for itself, President Carter impermissibly interfered with the 
workings of the Settlement Act. By substituting his judgment for 
that of the Congress, President Carter has encroached upon the 
authority Congress had reserved for itself in this area and deprived 
the various factions in the state of their input in the decision-
making process. 
As stated, the Settlement Act, by means of the Joint Land Use 
Planning Commission, provided all parties to the Alaskan dispute 
(the state, the Natives, the Executive and the Congress) with a 
voice in the decision as to what lands were to be withdrawn. 133 After 
this process was completed, Congress was to make the final determi-
nation. This fact was evidenced in the congressional debate in the 
Senate. Senator Bible, the drafter of the wilderness provisions of the 
Act, stated unequivocally that if land were to be withdrawn in 
Alaska, it was to be done by the Congress. 134 
Therefore, if the president intervened during the effective life of 
Organic Act of 1884; see text at note 29. "However, this Act only applies to third parties and 
not the government itself. Tee-Hit-Ton, supra note 33. The Settlement Act specifies that the 
Act does not create a trust relationship between the federal government and the Natives. H.R. 
REP. No. 523, 92d Cong., lBt Sess. 7, reprinted in (1971) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2192, 
2199. See also, CON'. REP. No. 746, 92d Cong., lBt Sess. 6, reprinted in (1971) U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2247, 2253. The intent of the Congress was to abolish any trust relation-
ship, with regard to land, which was created by the Organic Act, and put the Natives on their 
own footing. But see Rosenblatt, The Federal Trust ResponsilJility and Eskimo Whaling, 7 
B.C. ENV. APr. L. REv. 505, 522 (1979) for a discussion of federal trust responsibilities to 
Alaskan Natives in other areas. 
ISS See text at note 72, supra. 
133 See text at note 72, supra. 
134 In the debate, Senator Stevens of Alaska asked whether "this amendment provides that 
if there is to be any additional land added to these [national parks) ... it will be done by 
an act of Congress under this amendment." Senator Bible responded: "The Senator is cor-
rect." 117 CONGo REc. 38453 (1971). 
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the Settlement Act, that is, before December 18, 1978, his action 
would be contrary to the scheme of the Act. Congress had exclusive 
jurisdiction over the area. The Executive's power was to be limited 
to the Secretary's recommendations and the president's power to 
veto any bill from Congress. 135 A presidential proclamation would 
thwart the congressional plan to ensure participation from all 
groups. 
Since Congress reserved to itself exclusive power to deal with the 
Alaskan wilderness, there necessarily was a limitation of the Presi-
dent's power under the Antiquities Act. Since President Carter cre-
ated the national monuments on December 1, 1978, he would be in 
violation of the Settlement Act because he acted before the Decem-
ber 18 deadline. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Essentially, the Corporation contends that the President had no 
statutory authority to create the national monuments. In the first 
place, he acted outside the intended scope of the Antiquities Act. 
Secondly, if he had the requisite authority under the Antiquities 
Act, that power was withdrawn when Congress passed the State-
hood and Settlement Acts. 
A. The Antiquities Act 
To support its contention that the monuments do not satisfy the 
provisions of the Antiquities Act, the plaintiff relies heavily on the 
congressional history of the Act. 131 The Corporation points to House 
and Senate reports which, by their language, would seem to limit 
the scope of the Act to preserving small tracts of land which contain 
Indian relics and other prehistoric remains. 137 Clearly, the reports 
and the debates indicate that the type of wilderness withdrawals 
made by President Carter are not within the intended scope of the 
Act. 138 If these records were the only aid for construing the statute, 
'35 See text at notes 72-83, supra. 
,31 See text at notes 117-123, supra. 
137 See text at notes 117-123, supra. 
,38 In fact, the congressional history is in contradiction with the plain language of the Act 
which allows the president to withdraw land which contains "historic landmarks, historic or 
prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific value." 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976) 
(emphasis added). The language itself indicates that the Act was not limited to prehistoric 
Indian structures. 
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a reviewing court might well declare that the President's actions are 
illegal since the Alaskan monuments do not contain objects of antiq-
uity. Since legislative history is not binding on the courts, how-
ever,'3' courts have not taken such a restrictive view while constru-
ing the Antiquities Act. 14D 
The Supreme Court has consistently given great deference to the 
president's power to issue presidential proclamations generally}" 
The Court has stated that when Congress has given the president 
discretion to act or not act in an area, any abuse of that discretion 
is a dispute between the executive and the legislature; and as such 
should not be reviewed by the Court.142 When the president is exer-
cising his discretionary power, such as whether to create a national 
monument, any challenge to the merits of his decision is not justici-
able. 143 As long as the president complies procedurally with the stat-
ute, the courts cannot review the underlying factual determination 
which prompted the President to issue the proclamations. lu 
While the trend in the law has been to expand judicial review of 
executive actions,145 in an area such as this, where the Bristol Bay 
Native Corporation is challenging the factual determination made 
by the President when he created the monuments, the plaintiff has 
to show that there is no factual basis whatsoever for the proclama-
tions. Alternatively, the Corporation must show that the President's 
actions are not within the outer limits of his statutory authority. 148 
In the case of the Antiquities Act, this has proven to be a very 
difficult burden for a plaintiff to meet. The Supreme Court has 
"I 2A C. SANDS, supra note 120, at § 48.02. 
". See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 
450 (1920) . 
... United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371 (1940) . 
• <2 It has long been held that where Congress has authorized a public officer to take some 
specified legislative action when in his judgment that action is necessary or appropriate 
to carry out the policy of Congress, the judgment of the officer as to the existence of the 
facts calling for that action is not subject to review .... As stated by Mr. Justice Story 
. . . "whenever a statute gives discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him 
upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction, that the statute 
constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts." 
United States v. George S. Bush Co., 310 U.S. 371, 380 (1940). 
·"Id . 
• 44 Id . 
• 41 See, e.g., Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971) . 
... United States v. George S. Bush Co., 310 U.S. 371 (1940). 
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twice reviewed the validity of a national monument designation, 147 
and has upheld it on both occasions. Both cases centered around 
ecological sites rather than archeological objects. In Cameron v. 
United States,148 the plaintiff was challenging the validity of the 
Grand Canyon National Monument. Similarly, in a recent case, 
Cappaert v. United States,149 the subject of the lawsuit was Devil's 
Hole National Monument, a waterpool which is a remnant of the 
prehistoric Death Valley Lake System. 
In Cappaert, the plaintiffs, relying on the legislative history of the 
Antiquities Act, argued that the Antiquities Act only applied to 
archeological or historic sites, and not to environmental ones. Since 
Devil's Hole was not an archeological site, the president had no 
authority to reserve the pool. 150 However, as in Cameron, 151 the Court 
did not take such a limited view of the Act. Chief Justice Burger, 
speaking for a unanimous Court, rejected this argument, stating 
that the monument had scientific value, and therefore came within 
the ambit of the Act. 152 The Court concluded that a monument need 
only have scientific value, and need not contain historic or prehisto-
ric structures as well. ls3 
The justification implicit in the Court's decision is that to adopt 
the restrictions on the president urged by the petitioner would run 
counter to the plain meaning of the statute. 1M The language of the 
statute reads: "[ t ]he President [may] declare by public procla-
mation historic landmarks, historic or prehistoric structures, and 
other objects of historic or scientific interest ... [as] national 
monuments."1551f the purpose of the Act was only to protect objects 
of antiquity, then there would be no reason to add the words "of 
historic or scientific interest." The Act would convey the same 
meaning if it only reserved objects of historic or prehistoric int~rest, 
adding the words "scientific interest" would create a redundancy . 
.. , Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 
(1920) . 
... Cameron, supra note 147, at 451. 
... Cappaert, supra note 147, at 129. 
". [d. at 141-142. 
'51 Cameron, supra note 147, at 456. 
'" Cappaert, supra note 147, at 141-42. 
"3 [d. 
". The Supreme Court has stated, in the past, that when the meaning of the words in a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court has no discretion but must give those words full 
effect. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
'" 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976). For the full text of the Act see note 14, supra. 
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These words can add nothing to the meaning of "historic" or 
"prehistoric" which are not inherent in them already. Examining 
the Act, it is more logical to assume that the words "scientific inter-
est" were intended to give an additional grant of authority from 
what was given with the words "historic or prehistoric." 
Just as important as the liberal construction of the scope of the 
Act is the mode of analysis which the Court has adopted to deter-
mine whether the particular subject matter of the monument is an 
object of scientific interest. In Cameron, the Court in effect took 
judicial notice that the Grand Canyon was an object of scientific 
valuelH and did not engage in any weighing of conflicting evidence. 
Indeed, the Court did not even consider the possibility that the 
Grand Canyon was not an object of scientific interest. 117 In response, 
it can be said that with the Grand Canyon, there is no question but 
that it is of great scientific importance. Yet, in a considerably closer 
case, where the object of the monument was not of such extraordi-
nary value as the Grand Canyon, the Supreme Court again engaged 
in very perfunctory analysis. Again, in Cappaert, the Court merely 
assumed that Devil's Hole was an object of scientific interest. Its 
discussion on the point was limited to one sentence: "The pool in 
Devil's Hole and its rare inhabitants are 'objects of historic or scien-
tific interest. "'158 
Applying this standard of review, it clearly would not be difficult 
for presidential actions to withstand judicial scrutiny. One is hard 
pressed to imagine anything in the environment which is not of 
scientific interest. Furthermore, since the Court is willing to assume 
that something is of scientific interest, the burden on the govern-
ment is negligible. At most, to defend particular actions would re-
quire a showing that a significant body of the scientific community 
considers that the subject matter of the monument has some value. 
The monument need not even contain objects of scientific 
importance, only of interest. 
However, Cameron and Cappaert can be distinguished from the 
Bristol Bay litigation. In the case of the Becharofls8 and Katmai 180 
Monuments, there is nothing of peculiar scientific interest. Neither 
1M Cameron, supra note 147, at 456. 
1111d. 
118 Cappaert, supra note 147, at 142. 
I" Exec. Order No. 4613, 43 Fed. Reg. 57019 (1978). 
110 Exec. Order No. 4619, 43 Fed. Reg. 57059 (1978). 
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place contains the only natural habitat of the salmon or brown bear, 
whereas the Grand Canyon is unique and Devil's Hole contains a 
fish found nowhere else in the world. l81 The present case is also 
distinguishable because of the massive size of Katmai and Becharof; 
the reserves contain 1.37182 and 1.2183 million acres respectively. In-
deed, some of the Alaskan monuments are as much as 8 million 
acres in size. 1M In contrast, Devil's Hole Monument is comprised of 
forty acres. 185 Therefore, it may be possible to demonstrate that the 
objects of importance could be preserved with smaller withdrawals. 
However, while Becharof and Katmai are different from Cappaert 
and Cameron in degree, they are not different in kind. When dealing 
with the Grand Canyon, it is much easier to find the requisite scien-
tific interest. However, the Antiquities Act speaks only of objects of 
scientific interest and is not limited to protecting objects of extraor-
dinary value. The language in the Act is more far-reaching. While 
it is true that the Alaskan brown bear is found in several areas of 
the state188 and in several of the new monuments, withdrawing more 
than one of these habitats and designating it a national monument 
does not threaten the legality of all the monuments. If there could 
be only one such monument, how would a court determine which 
one to keep? Either the natural habitat of the brown bear is of 
scientific interest or it is not. The fact that there are other areas of 
equal value should be irrelevant. 
However, the Supreme Court's analysis is not without problems. 
Because of the very broad definition that can be given to the words 
"scientific interest," Times Square could be considered of scientific 
interest. Almost anything in our modern-day society could come 
within the range of the Act. The Court could hold that designating 
Times Square a national monument was within the scope of the Act. 
Yet, it cannot completely ignore the congressional history. Moreo-
ver, if the Court wishes to adopt the plain-meaning rule, it must also 
"' Cappaert, supra note 147, at 132. 
112 Presidential Proclamation accompanying Exec. Order No. 4613, 43 Fed. Reg. 57019-20 
(1978). 
II. Presidential Proclamation accompanying Exec. Order No. 4619, 43 Fed. Reg. 57059-60 
(1978). 
lB. Gates of the Arctic National Monument contains 8.2 million acres. Exec. Order No. 
4617, 43 Fed. Reg. 57043. (1978). 
II. Cappaert, supra note 147, at 129. 
, .. In fact, the animal is quite common throughout southern Alaska. J. McFEE, supra note 
6, at 57-59. 
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realize that the meaning of the word "scientific" has changed be-
tween 1906 and 1978 and that, perhaps, the 1906 meaning should 
define the limits of the Act. One possible definition for "scientific" 
might be that the word refers to objects of ecological value. This 
would closely parallel the meaning of "scientific" in 1906, before 
psychology and social sciences became part of the general concious-
ness. Thus any object of interest in nature or the physical world 
would be subject to the Act. This definition is also appropriate, 
since the typical national monument is concerned with preserving 
wilderness areas. IS7 Therefore, the President would have the author-
ity, under this definition, to preserve historic structures and ecologi-
cal areas. As a result, the Alaskan monuments would be legal since 
they contain objects of environmental value. 
B. The Statehood Act 
In addition to the claims involving the Antiquities Act, the Corpo-
ration alleges that the President has violated the Statehood Act as 
well. ISS The Corporation fears that royalty payments which the state 
owes will not be paid because the land available for the state's land 
selections will not be valuable}s, 
However, the presidential proclamations do not violate the Act. 
First, the Act allows the state to choose from all federal lands 
"which are vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved at the time of 
their selection."17o The very language of the statute contemplates a 
fluctuating, ever-changing selection pool. To limit the federal gov-
ernment's authority to manage its own land until the fifty years171 
had elapsed would be unreasonable. By handcuffing the federal 
government in such a way, a court would be unfairly limiting the 
federal rights of ownership in disregard of clear statutory language 
to the contrary. The more reasonable interpretation would give the 
federal government the right to dispose of its land as it sees fit, up 
to the time that the land is selected by the State of Alaska. Other-
wise, millions of acres of land would be held in a state of limbo, with 
the federal government unable to respond to any problems of the 
187 See note 89, supra. For a list of recently created national monuments, see 16 V.S.C.A. 
§ 431 (1976). 
"' Alaskan Statehood Act, §§ 1-20, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958) . 
• " See text at notes 125-129. 
17. Alaskan Statehood Act, § 6(b), Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958). 
17. See note 45, supra. 
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land for fear of prejudicing the state's rights. Moreover, the procla-
mations themselves are careful not to prejudice any existing state 
rights. The national monuments are subject to prior valid selections 
by the Native corporations and the state}?2 
Nor is such a limitation of the president's power to reserve na-
tional monuments consistent with the intent of the Statehood Act. 
The legislation was not designed to permanently solve the problem 
of ownership of the Alaskan land. 173 Instead, the Act was designed 
to give the state a land grant, with Congress reserving other ques-
tions regarding Alaskan land until a later date. For example, the Act 
maintained the status quo regarding Native rights to their land. 174 
The Act also reserved a large tract of land for defense purposes. 175 
Congress authorized the president to approve state selections in the 
area, after deciding how much land would be needed to satisfy de-
fense needs. 178 Likewise, the creation of the national monuments, 
although not dealt with expressly in the Act, remained in the back-
ground, an ever-present limitation of the state's right to choose its 
land for its grant. 
Therefore, the right of the president to operate under the Antiqui-
ties Act should not be so easily restricted.177 To infer a repeal of the 
Antiquities Act, when there is nothing in the Statehood Act to sug-
gest such a revocation, would be tantamount to judicialla~making. 
Such a limitation of the president's power should only be inferred 
when the president's exercise of this power would prevent the effec-
tive implementation of the Statehood Act.ns However, there is no 
such conflict in the present situation. The withdrawal of 56 million 
acres does not reduce the selection pool so much that there is not 
enough land to satisfy the state's land grant, nor does it leave the 
state with only worthless land from which to select. Included in the 
selections already made by the state is the oil-rich North Slope of 
Alaska.179 Therefore, the State of Alaska has not been deprived of 
172 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 4611, 43 Fed. Reg. 57009 (1978). 
173 H.R. REP. No. 624, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 2933, 2951. 
'74 [d. 
17. Alaskan Statehood Act, § 10, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958). 
'71 [d. 
177 C. SANDS, supra note 120, § 23.09. An implied revocation of a statute, here the Antiqui-
ties Act, is strongly disfavored. See text at note 183, infra. 
17. See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
17. Judge, supra note 5, at 734. "What is not so clear is the value of the state-owned Prudhoe 
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any substantive rights guaranteed by the Statehood Act. 
C. The Settlement Act 
The Bristol Bay Native Corporation also alleges that the new 
national monuments violate the Settlement Act, in that they have 
made the Corporation's land selection worthless. ISO The strongest 
argument plaintiff can make is that, by setting a December 18 dead-
line for itself and by establishing the Joint Land Use Planning Com-
mission, Congress reserved exclusive jurisdiction for itself in the 
area. 181 By acting before the December 18 deadline, President Carter 
illegally interfered with congressional jurisdiction and so violated 
the Settlement Act. 182 Because Congress retained exclusive jurisdic-
tion, there was an implied revocation of the President's power under 
the Antiquities Act. 
However, it is difficult to prove that there has been an implied 
revocation. The Supreme Court has often stated that there is a 
"cardinal rule ... that rep~als by implication are not favored."183 
Plaintiff must show either that the congressional intention to repeal 
was clear and manifest,184 or that there is a "clear repugnancy be-
tween the old and new [law]. "185 
There is nothing in the legislative history of the Settlement Act 
which manifests a clear intent to repeal the Antiquities Act. 18H Thus, 
plaintiff must show that there is a Clear repugnance between the 
Settlement Act and the Antiquities Act; that President Carter's 
actions frustrate the scheme and spirit of the Settlement Act. 
Viewing the Settlement Act as a whole, however, it is clear that 
President Carter's actions did not thwart the intent of the Act, but 
have instead actually fulfilled it. By creating the national monu-
Bay field. When fully developed, each of its 150 wells will be capable of producing an average 
of 10,000 barrels a day, compared to the average production of a well in the Lower Forty-Eight 
of 11 barrels a day. The net profit to the oil companies is variously estimated at between three 
and eight million dollars a day." [d . 
• 80 Bristol Bay, supra note 111, at 12 . 
• 8. See text at notes 130-135 . 
• 12 43 U.S.C. § 1616(d)(l) (1976) . 
• os Tennessee Valley Authority, 437 U.S. 153, 189 (1978) (citing with approval Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974» . 
. 1. Tennessee Valley Authority, 437 U.S. 153, 189 (1978) . 
... [d. (citing with approval Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. 343, 363 (1842» . 
... See, generally, CONF. REP. No. 746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2247. 
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ments, the President has filled the void Congress created when it 
failed to enact a bill before the December 18, 1978 deadline. If 
Congress had acted, the result would have been no different. Be-
cause the Settlement Act contemplates a withdrawal of 80 million 
acres, a withdrawal of 56 million acres of land, in and of itself, does 
not frustrate the operation of the Act, particularly since President 
Carter acted within the time allotted in the Settlement Act for 
congressional action. 187 Moreover, President Carter's selections are 
identical to those originally recommended by the Secretary of the 
Interior Rogers Morton, which were incorporated into the aborted 
H.R. 39. 188 
Even if Congress intended to reserve exclusive jurisdiction for 
itself in Alaska, there are mitigating factors in this case. The Presi-
dent's actions came within seventeen days of the expiration of the 
Act and almost two months after Congress had adjourned for the 
year. 181 Therefore, there was no chance that Congress would enact a 
law unless there was a special session of Congress. As a result, the 
President's violation of the Settlement Act is a matter of form rather 
than substance. The President may have technically violated the 
Act, but in no significant way did he pre-empt congressional author-
ity in the area. 11lI 
It is difficult to say whether a court would insist on the letter of 
the law, or would instead excuse any violation because of the miti-
gating circumstances surrounding the President's decision. Perhaps 
the wisest course would be to sustain the proclamation, even if there 
is an arguable violation of the Settlement Act, since there was no 
violation of the central purpose of the Settlement Act. In any event, 
Congress can revoke the creation of a national monument. III 
,.7 43 U.S.C. § 1616(d)(1) (1976). 
, .. In 1978 the House of Representatives passed a bill setting aside 95 million acres for 
national parks, refuges and forests, which included all the land set aside by President Carter. 
A similar provision was favorably reported out of committee in the Senate. However, the bill 
died in the conference committee. 
, •• 9 ENVIR. REP. 1403 (BNA) (1979). 
'10 There is a question of whether the Natives can raise the December 1 issue. Arguably, 
the abrogation of congressional authority is a dispute between the legislature and the execu-
tive. As such, if the issue is to be raised, it must be done by Congress. Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). Even then, the Court may refuse to adjudi-
cate the dispute, as it may be a non-justiciable political question. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186 (1962). As such, the Natives would have no standing to raise the interest of Congress, 
even though they might be effected by the President's actions. 
"' Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The history of Alaska has been one of federal neglect. The inhab-
itants of the state resent the intrusion of the federal government at 
this late date. Therefore, they have been quick to challenge the 
legality of President Carter's recent proclamations which set aside 
56 million acres of land for environmental purposes. 
In particular, the Bristol Bay Native Corporation has challenged 
the legality of two national monuments, Becharof and Katmai. 
First, they allege that President Carter acted outside the scope of 
the Antiquities Act when he created the monuments. However, the 
proclamations should be able to withstand the attack. Given the 
liberal view the Supreme Court has taken towards the president's 
power under the Antiquities Act in the past, the national monu-
ments should be upheld. 
In addition, the Natives contend that the monuments are illegal 
in that they violate the Statehood Act. It is clear, however, from the 
terms of the Act, that Congress wanted to maintain the president's 
flexibility to create monuments in Alaska. 
More problematic is the question of whether the Settlement Act 
pre-empted the President's authority to create these monuments. 
By acting before the December 18, 1978 deadline, the President has 
infringed upon congressional authority. Yet since Congress had ad-
journed for the year, the violation is more technical than substan-
tive. Therefore, the proclamations should not be overturned. 
In late 1979, Congress tried to resolve the conflict. A resurrected 
version of H.R. 39 passed the House of Representatives on May 16, 
1979,,'2 However, the bill has subsequently encountered difficulty in 
the Senate, where Senator Gravel of Alaska has attempted to block 
passage of the bill. 1.3 The ultimate resolution of the conflict is uncer-
tain . 
•• 2 10 ENVIR. REp. 75 (BNA) (1979) . 
• 11 10 ENVIR. REp. 1448 (BNA) (1979). 
